With this contribution we want to join the theoretical discussion about shifting contents and new perspectives in the social studies of science. Despite all its differences, the social studies of science once shared a coherent perspective, namely to relate the knowledge content of science to social factors.

From the very beginning, a strong emphasis had been put on the social construction of science. Meanwhile, however, “constructivism” as a methodological and theoretical device is slowly disappearing. Michael Lynch, in his recent book states a “crisis in relativist and constructivist studies” (1993: 103), and for Karin Knorr-Cetina “constructivism … is not … a world view or a life-time occupation.” Therefore she presumes that “there will be a time when it is more useful to take the questions and run from constructivism” (1993: 561-562). Others, like Andrew Pickering (1992) and Bruno Latour (1987), simply do not mention the term “constructivism” any longer in their book indices.

The term “social” is even more contested. Especially in empirical studies on scientific practice and in the actor-network approach a sharp criticism of social biases in previous science studies is put forward. Our argument with regard to this heated debate is threefold:

First, we will give a brief introduction to basic assumptions and common features of those science studies, which claim to have overcome what Andrew Pickering, Bruno Latour and others call “sociological reductionism”.

Second, we will draw attention to the inherent limitations of the post-sociological alternatives presented. Apart from the problem that the constitution of single phenomena has to be taken for granted, the question remains open, how all the observed phenomena and their outputs are related to each other if not by cognitive and social factors. Third, we will show that the shift towards practice and the actor- network approach are, despite their claimed newness, a direct consequence of the limited and rather metaphorical use of social theory, which characterize the social studies of science in general.

Basic assumptions and common features of recent science studies One main objective of the present studies is to focus on all dimensions of scientific research. Therefore the traditional limitation to social dimensions seems to be too narrow. Entities which previously were neglected are included in the analysis. See, e.g., Ian Hacking: “I am not to argue for idealism but for a rather down-to-earth materialism. Mine is a thesis about the relationships between thoughts, acts, and manufactures” (1992: 30).

The so-called shift towards scientific practice focuses on the amount of equipment and technology, which is relevant in a laboratory setting and which is taken as an actively shaping part of scientific research. As a consequence, equipment and technology are regarded as a cause for the production of scientific knowledge in the same way as the scientists` cognitive contributions. Karin Knorr- Cetina, for example, has even emphasized in a case study on particle physics: “The production, measurement and description of the relevant particles takes place in an integrated way in the inside of the apparatus. The surrounding “laboratory” (in quotation marks) is the service station for the machine, which is the true laboratory” (1988: 328-329). In a similar vein, Andrew Pickering tries to attribute a constitutive role to the material world in science. Scientific results are then seen as inherently shaped by what he calls “maneuvers in the field of material agency” (1993: 581).

A second emerging trend can be identified in the actor-network approach of the Paris School. Bruno Latour, its most prominent representative, aims at blurring the boundaries of the distinction between the social, on the one side, and technology and nature on the other side. These a priori distinctions have to be substituted, since a network is composed of different actors and their interactions, all of which contribute to its strength or weakness. As a consequence, microbes are introduced as new social actors (1988a: 35 ff.), scallops are understood as beings with ends (1988a: 167), and even “reflexion” is transfered to nonhuman living beings and technical artefacts (1988b: 173).

To sum up, both developments have a common objective. Namely, the complete representation of the interactions of single components. However, this ambitious modification causes two conceptual problems: First, the constitution of each of these components usually is taken for granted. It remains implicit why microbes are not treated as a result of molecular processes, and why technical artefacts are not broken into single subcomponents like nuts and bolts. The second problem refers to the question how the components relate to each other. This is grounded in the claim that the approach avoids to consider technology and nature only as a function of human activities.

This stands in sharp contrast to the former social constructivist dogma, where causal priority was assigned to the social. As a consequence, these older science studies focused on the social shaping of nature and technology. No matter whether society as a whole or local thought collectives of single research groups were considered to be relevant, in each case social contexts were assumed to be the location where not only the negotiation of scientific results takes place, but also the production of technology and the definition of nature. Hence, social reality served as a key to open up all other phenomena and their relationship to each other. This perspective has been abandoned.

Limitations of the shift towards practice and the actor-network approach

Recent science studies document directly visible phenomena. Each component is taken as an independent factor. Single components are interesting only as far as they produce material outcomes. Internal characteristics of single components are left out of consideration in the same way as those relations between them which lie beneath the surface.

Such a material and outcome-oriented perspective could have been integrated by a physical theory of science, focussing exclusively on movements, emissions and noise of scientists and other components. Instead key terms of the social sciences, like agency, actor and interaction, reappear and are employed for the description of single components and their relation to each other. Cognitive dimensions like intention and reflection are ascribed in the same way. These concepts are no longer limited to the analysis of scientists and the relations between them, but transferred to all visible phenomena - computers, detectors, and microbes. Unfortunately, they are employed in an ad hoc and arbitrary manner, without careful consideration of the rules and obstacles of such transformation, or of the repercussions on the content of the concept involved.

Two examples illustrate this point: First, in a completely desocialized definition of action, the relevant dimensions of intention and meaning as well as normative and cultural aspects, are sacrificed in order to treat all observable entities in the same manner. As a consequence, scientists do research in the same way as the sun shines, planes fly, taps drip water and test-tubes break. Second, also the underlying concept of interaction is an extremely reductionist one. Aspects which lie beneath the surface and which can be reconstructed only from an internal point of view, like the process-character of interaction and the mutual structures of meaning and expectation within the interaction, are sacrificed. As a consequence, not only can scientists interact with computers but a toaster can interact with a piece of toast.

The symmetrical consideration of all kinds of phenomena is common ground for the post-sociology of science. Beyond that, there are differences. While those who advocate the shift towards scientific practice pursue an empiricist ideal, Latour`s actor- network approach is characterized by theoretical and ethical aspirations. In a brutishly anticonstructivist manner networks are treated as an objective structure, and Latour can present himself as its legitimate and independent speaker. His language contains both: an excessive use of terms borrowed from social theory and, correspondingly, a devaluation of the content of these terms. The implications have been shown above.

Social reductionisms in the Social Studies of Science

The shortcomings of post-sociological science studies have also been discussed by others. Some critics even have argued for a return to the more traditional paths of the social studies of science (Collins/Yearley 1992 a,b). Our point is that this will not suffice, since the problems experienced now - namely the lack of a theory which allows for an understanding of how things are structured and processed - can be traced back to the core assumptions of the social studies of science. Therefore, continuation, not revolution should be the right term to characterize the development. Though less obvious and hidden by an excessive use of social metaphors, the former approaches were already characterized by a very narrow understanding of the social dimensions in science.

Shortcomings with regard to the social dimensions are characteristic of the two perhaps most influential, but entirely different schools in the social studies of science, namely the strong programme and the ethnomethodological approach. The strong program started with the social environment, which was supposed to determine science (Bloor 1976, Barnes 1977). Here, social dimensions were reduced to broader societal interests without specifying the mechanisms which transform these external forces into the social structures and processes of science. In contrast, the ethnomethodological approach by Knorr-Cetina (1981) and Lynch (1985) started with individual scientists. Here, social dimensions in science were reduced to scientists’ negotiations. Science now appeared to be like an unstructered vacuum, without a past and without a future.

While the ethnomethodological approach by Knorr-Cetina (1981) and Lynch (1985) had at least an idea of the dynamics of social interaction, Latour and Woolgar (1979) in their book on “Laboratory Life” employed an entirely desocialized concept of human action and interaction. The main unit of analysis, individual actors, was conceptualized as nothing but strategically operating and manipulating entities. Though the study is subtitled “The social construction of scientific facts”, common features of social constructivism like routines and habits, collective belief systems, and processes of integration and identity formation (Berger/ Luckmann 1967) seem to be of minor importance. Likewise, all kinds of symbolic dimensions (Douglas 1982, Goffman 1967) were neglected. Instead, their oversimplified and reductionist model of man allowed for the observation of the scientists’ actions and interactions as if they were automata, programmed to pursue their individual interest. From this point of view, the social character of knowledge production is reduced to aggregate outcomes - of human actors. This leads rights back to recent trends in the social studies of science. The purified concept of action as employed by Latour/Woolgar (1979) can be - and apparently has been - transferred plainly to all kinds of entities, regardless of whether they are human. As a consequence, men, machines and microbes likewise appear as acting entitities. All differences disappear, and everything becomes possible in the new, enriched world of science studies.

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