The Globalization of Environmental Discourse

Review of Steven Yearley, Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization, Sage, London, 1996. 161 pages, ISBN 08039 7517-1 (pbk); 0 8039 7516-3 (hardback)

Environmental discourse has given us the awareness of the global, all encompassing nature of some of the processes of environmental change. The “climate catastrophy”, the diminishing ozone layer or the reduced forest cover of the earthþs surface are seen as problems facing “mankind” thus strongly invoking the idea that, when it comes to the ecological crisis, “we are all in a same boat”. The emphasis on the global dimension of the ecological crisis stems from the early 1970s. This was the era of “saving the planet” and brought about the globalization of the terms of environmental discourse, at least in the circles of policy makers. The concept of globalization has other meanings and other connotations. It primarily refers to political-economic changes and is employed to give a label to the increasing power international financial networks and the growing interdependency in the political-economic sphere. Globalization is then seen as the product of an interplay of the new communication technologies that allow for rapid movement of data and thus of funds, a new political-ideological turn to free market policies that have materialized in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), WTO (World Trade Organization), and geo-political shifts (new emerging markets, increased inpact of new industrialized countries, and the political responses to these developments as in NAFTA or the creation of a European monetary union). The second meaning of the concept of globalization is that not only suggest do the interdependencies occur on a larger scale than before, it also suggests that the world has become smaller. This is the idea of a “shrinking” of the globe both in a physical and a cultural sense. It refers to the diminishing importance of distance, the “annihilation of space by time”, the alleged þdeath of distanceþ and the proliferation of Western life styles that came with. It are the cultural icons and narratives of Coca Cola, Disney and McDonalds that represent the most prominent forces of this new globalized cultural discourse. The emphasis on a growing interdependency and the strong forces of a cultural colonization (also known as “cocacolonazation”) suggest that we are becoming aware that, when it comes to globalization, we are in the same boat too. Interestingly, the term “globalization” is almost never related to the global turn in environmental discourse as described above.

Stephen Yearley’s Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization examines the ways in which the coupling of the quasi-independent knowledges underpinning global environmental discourse on the one hand and globalization on the other, can produce new insights. He assumes that these two processes interrelate: the world is being compressed and people are becoming more aware that there is “only one planet” as the classical statement had it. Yearley pits the two against oneanother and wonders what environmental phenomena and environmentalism can tell us about the nature of globalization and what the sociology of environmentalism can learn from theories of globalization. This is a highly relevant and courageous endeavour. It is highly relevant too, since sociological enquiry has traditionally been weak both on non-national issues such as globalization as well as on the issue of environment and nature. Despite the fact that it often aims to produce knowledge with a universal validity, there is a very clear national bias in sociological theory. Whoever has been in the position to teach the same subject in different national contexts will appreciate that sociology has, in this sense, thus far produced several versions of universal knowledge. The environment is also relatively new territory for sociologists. Ever since Durkheimþs dictum that sociology should come up with social explanations for social facts, nature has been blended out. With a few exceptions sociology has indeed used this exclusively social orientation as a strategy to carve out its own territory on the academic map. In light of recent events, both these biases of sociology become problematic. The planet, the earth, our common future, global warming: all pose new questions to the sociological curriculum, as do global financial networks, global cities, and new patterns in international migration.

It is obvious that an endeavour of this sort is extremely demanding. Without a clear focus one would easily drown in the array of approaches to both subjects. The fact that the study of environmentalism and globalization are indeed of separate intellectual origin only enhances this problem. Yearley’s book is better seen as an exploration. It is not a firm and robust, theoretically grounded argument on the various dimensions of globalization of the relationships between man and nature. He first discusses the existing sociology of globalization more in particular the work of Wallerstein on the world system and Sklair on transnational capitalism. He criticizes their work for its alleged mono-causality. In his critique he draws heavily on the work of Roland Robertson, Mike Featherstone and Anthony Giddens. Somewhat surprisingly, Yearley does not systematically discuss the work of these authors even though they come out to be the main source of inspiration for Yearley’s thinking on globalization. There was good reason to do so. After all, the work of Robertson and Featherstone comes from a school of thought related to the journal Theory, Culture & Society that have not only produced very insightful work on globalization but have made substantial progress in cracking the meaning of the contemporary ecological crisis as well. Instead of taking this more or less overseeable path, Yearley steps back and carves out a route of his own. The book continues with a discussion of various forms of universal or universalising languages - arguing that the latter ones are often drawn upon to come to grips (or frame) global phenomena. He points out that “Systematic analysis of the ‘universal’ can easily be traced back to the philosophers of classical Greece” and embarks on a discussion of the analysis of the intellectual traditions of geometry, arithmatic, logic, science, and, somewhat surprisingly, contemporary theories of justice. These discussions are too brief to be of real help or it would have to be for the general appreciation of the idea that universalist ideas about knowledge have a cultural bias and come with exclusionary effects.

Another step in the exploration is a lengthy discussion of the world’s environmental problems. It is written in the somewhat naive language that some geographers use when writing about environmental politics: strongly realist with a very basic idea of the power games that occur. Yearley concludes that the various environmental problems actually compress the world (as the globalization thesis suggests) since the extent to which countries depend on oneanother increases. “The diminution of resources and the loss of species are making people aware that there are global limits to the things and the creatures which they count on. To some extent at least, these considerations are giving citizens, governments and corporations a sense that there are real global ties and, perhaps, in principle at least a global identity for the occupants of spaceship Earth.” (59). Here the analysts seems to fall prey to the language he is supposed to analyse. The uncritical usage of “resources” and “species” as key to the idea that there are global ties, the idea that knowledge of these ties actually will result in new identities, and that these identities would allow us to finally undersand our þtrueþ identity as “occupants of spaceship Earth”: it is as if Yearley is unaware of the fact that these concepts, assumptions and metaphors are all related to the dominant discourse of eco-management which is not at all an unproblematic approach. Indeed, it is mostly seen as part of the problem. This is the more surprising since Yearley subsequently succesfully deconstructs the very idea of a global turn in environmental politics. Yearley concludes that some problems are more global than others (61) and that one should be appreciative of the fact that the very definition of environmental problems as global problems could, in some cases, be part of a “politics-of-interest”. As Yearley’s puts it, “To put it crudely, there may be other reasons than pure environmental concern for wishing to see certain environmental issues handled as matters of international, global priority.” (61) Indeed, Yearley shows that some of the key issues on global environmental discourse, such as the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions, are, on closer examination, tied up in power struggles over who should have what right to develop economically.

Arguably the best section in the book is Yearley’s discussion of the concrete attempts to employ particular knowledge systems to create a universal basis for environmental politics. Here many well known references for people working in the SSK tradition can be found. Scientists have a had a key role in defining what counts as an environmental problem. Yet it was not as if science just functioned to put issues on the agenda. Science was important as provider of the particular discourse that facilitated global consensus. Science is here seen as a practice that allows to produce universally valid truth, thus opening the possibility to negotiate agreements on the remedial strategies required. Yet since science is explicitly silent on cultural matters, it cannot make differences between what some authors have called “survival emissions” and “luxury emissions”. In other cases the very methods with which data were generated implied a cultural bias. Yearley concludes that scientific discourse is not very effective as basis for political agreements. Environmental economics, the idea that nature could be brought into the economic equations, cannot pre-structure the political decision making on environmental issues either. Here it is required to put values on nature and that implies an essentially cultural discussion. It is hardly conceivable that one would find a universal system of valuation for this problem. Sustainable development, then, is in itself not a basis, but at best a general outlook. The role of NGOs is not unproblematic either. Yearley rightly notes that in their commitment to act upon the troublesome state of nature environmental NGOs are often unaware of their own cultural biases and can become rather expert oriented and technocratic. In the end, it seems hard to include nature in a trade-off with - dare we say - other social goals. Towards the conclusion Yearley admits that “The difficulties encountered in the practical application of the universalizing discourse of science lead one to a sceptical view of any idea that the recognition of global ‘oneness’ prepares the way for authoritative ‘master’ discourses.” (149)

At this point one wonders whether insights such as the above, should not lead to a rather different account of the challenges facing environmental politics. Yearley’s book seems ridden by a discrepancy in this regard. Between the lines one senses that Yearley wants to explore how environmentalism can help bring about a global identity. Yearley opens his book using Robertson’s distinction between þobjectiveþ aspects of globalization (global marketing, world-wide financial markest) and “subjective” aspects that refer to the fact that we see ourselves increasingly as þparticipants in a globalized world”. This subjective element is then conflated with a growing consciousness of global “citizenship”, although citizenship is usually reserved for a much more active acting upon a particular consciousness. If one reads the book with this political ideal in mind, Yearley’s book is depressing. The number of mechanisms that seem to work against an effective green politics are countless. Yearley has to give up the idea that science can help, realizes that global environmental NGOs are not always to be trusted, so what is left? Well, globalization. Key in his book seems to be the assumption that diffusion of knowledge or awareness of global interconnections and global eco-catatrophies will produce a political change. Yearley postulates that the force of globalization actually potentially helps to produce the awareness needed to face global environmental problems. Quite against a common sense position, he argues that “the more that products and popular culture become the same wherever people go, the stronger the grounds for people perceiving themselves as members of a global community, the more likely they appear to be to support Amnesty International or Greenpeace International.” (p.9) MacDonalds, Coca Cola and Disney pave the way for a chance in cultural values. If this is true, perhaps there is still hope.

A less naive and probably more promising line of thought would break with the global discourse altogether. Indeed, this seems to be what is happening in environment politics today. As the institutional arrangements of global environmental politics falter, new, more regional approaches seem to point the way forward. Perhaps the globalization of environmental discourse was just a station on the way. Suddenly, Rio is no longer seen as the “apex” of all political developments, just as it becomes obvious that it was a mistake to think that environmental politics was all about raising consciousness, after which action would, quasi automatically, follow (if people could only be made aware!). The next phase in environmental politics seems to be about the repositioning of environmental issues in a broader cultural critique. Science and mainstream policy making institutions cannot be relied on to start produce solutions after having been implicated in co-producing the problem for decades as sociologists have pointed out. Environmental politics, then, is not about the implementation of the optimal solutions but about a conscious political development of society, taking nature and other cultural concerns into account.