Report of a workshop at the University of Amsterdam, 27-29 April 2005, organised by Brian Balmer, University College London, & Sally Wyatt, University of Amsterdam
This workshop grew, in part, from recognising a number of shared concerns that both of us felt when reading student work in Science and Technology Studies, and from talking with colleagues who shared similar experiences. Even the best student writing could provoke such uncharitable thoughts as: What is this a case study of? What does it add to our understanding of different concepts? How does it contribute to discussions of anything outside the case study? How can the student think it reasonable to use concepts from completely different normative and epistemological traditions in the same case study? There seemed to be some missing middle ground, something that would add up to more than ‘not just another case study’. Going beyond such frustrations, we began to wonder if these problems were arising because of the ways in which STS is presented in the literature and in teaching. Fixing the blame on ourselves, we asked, how, given the state of the academic field, would students know to do anything differently? In Amsterdam in April 2005, 24 academics came together for three days aiming to discuss the role of middle-range theories in Science and Technology Studies. The majority of participants were based in British or Dutch institutions, though not all of these people are British or Dutch. Eleven of the 24 participants were women (though all of the professors present were men). All were white. Younger scholars were well represented: three current PhD students; three people who have received their PhDs within the past 12 months and a further three who have received their PhDs within the past 2-3 years. Our original invitation to participants included the following paragraphs:
Within STS there are a few ‘grand theories’ such as ANT and SCOT. STS scholars have also put forward various programmatic statements, such as the Strong Programme and more recently the ‘Third Wave’ of science studies. In contrast, numerous detailed empirical studies exist which add to our understanding of particular concerns but may not, or are not intended to, generalise beyond their substantive areas of concern. Studies can often appear to trade-off abstraction and generalisation with the demands of remaining faithful to the complexity of their empirical material. While this may or may not be a necessary or desirable feature of STS, it is usually not explicitly discussed as a choice. Our aim is to make this gap, between the empirical richness of individual studies and the development of middle-range theory, the topic of focused and critical workshop discussion.
We are seeking four types of contribution in the form of a paper for circulation prior to the meeting.
• Whether or not we need ‘middle-range theory’ or other ways of bridging between focused studies and ‘grand theories’
• Contributions which use on-going empirical research to reflect upon these ‘middle-range’ issues
• Contributions which focus on the problems of operationalising ‘grand’ STS theories
• Contributions which focus on ways of developing the skills of presenting such material.
Looking back at the invitation, during and after the workshop, it included two implicit assumptions that could be interrogated further. The first, echoing Robert Merton, is that we wanted to raise the question of whether or not STS should be more engaged with producing theories of the middle range in order to avoid the mistakes Merton associated with sociology. In Social Theory and Social Structures, Merton argued for ‘theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, social organisation and social change’ (Merton, 1968: 39). According to Merton, failure to develop middle range theory prevented sociology from maturing as a science – a direction, needless to say, STS scholars would be sceptical of following. Of more contemporary relevance, for Merton the failure to develop such theories, by focusing instead on the production of descriptions or the production of theories of everything, meant that sociology was unable to engage with wider audiences for its work. For Merton, middle-range theory meant engaging with reality, albeit a limited aspect of it; producing theoretical accounts that engaged with that reality which themselves could be used to communicate with others, whether policy-makers or scholars from other disciplines; and providing ideas for future work. In the words of today, Merton was concerned with issues of accountability and engagement, and it remains an important consideration whether theories of the middle range would facilitate different sorts of engagement for STS. The second assumption is that our invitation, also following Merton, conceptualised the middle as the space between the theoretical imagination and the richly empirical textures of lived experience. One of the main areas of discussion during the workshop was precisely about how limited this second assumption was, that the middle is much more complicated. Indeed, as the assumptions in our original invitation were dissected and challenged in the workshop papers and discussions, the topic of ‘middle-range theory in STS’ proved to be a fruitful one for considering the state of STS and theorising more generally. Our formulation of the problem was not shared by everyone, with some participants suggesting that even by thinking about the middle we were in fact reinforcing the divide between the micro and the macro (Woolgar). But, the spirit was correct in suggesting that STS needs something to avert the dangers of repeating ourselves, of losing our critical – some argued anarchic and mischief-making – edge. Although the workshop group was small, there were nevertheless too many voices and perspectives aired over the three days to even suggest that we could offer a definitive statement about the middle-range. Some participants were cautious of speaking on behalf of a homogenised entity called ‘STS’, and most, if not all, recognised that a diverse range of positions on the significance of the ‘middle’ was inevitable. Our aim, in this brief report, is to provide some flavour of the discussions, organised around a series of questions that were revisited over the course of the workshop, and which we, the organisers, have identitfied as the most interesting/productive currents of debate.
What or where is the middle range? Our discussions ranged between thinking of the middle range as an adjective, as in middle-range theory, as a noun or place and as a verb or process. When middle-range is used as an adjective, it is closest to Merton’s conception, the moving between theory and data (Morris & Balmer; Geels). When middle range is used as a noun or as a place it becomes liminal: the place between theories, between audiences, between levels. Discussion touched on whether this middle range place is an (empty) space/gap between case studies and theory, or the grey area where the two already meet and mix but which is not properly interrogated? Can we think of the middle as a location of shared concerns? (Rappert) Alternatively, when ‘to middle range’ is used as a verb (Brown), it becomes a process or performance, middling but not muddling. Then middle ranging is a way of making connections across time, discipline, community and place. All three of these ways of thinking about the middle range do have some sense of movement, and it is that capacity for moving, travelling or resonating that seemed, to many at the workshop, most important.
What do we want [theories in] STS to do?
For logical positivists, theories are the most concise summaries of as many empirical facts as possible. Workshop participants articulated a number of very different ideas about theories and their utility (Rip). Theories can be explanations or interpretations; they are sets of related concepts; they can be used ‘to shoot holes in essentialisms’. In STS, some of the things we call theories, such as SCOT and ANT may, some argued, actually be better understood as methodologies or ontologies. Theories can be communication devices, namely abstractions or generalisations which can help us to convey our ideas to policy makers (and other non-academic groups), to students, between different academic communities, or between STS scholars studying different objects. In turn, this latter version of theory opened up questions about how to theorise audiences within and beyond STS.
Does opening up the middle open up new questions, new methods? Again, discussion ranged widely around this topic over the course of the workshop. Are (ethnographic) case studies the only way to do STS research? Is there not a danger that case studies in STS carry a hidden commitment to realism? (Brown) What is the basis for the constant moral pressure to relate “micro” level work to the “bigger picture”? Is there, on the other hand, sometimes a zealousness associated with doing micro-level, case study work? If so, is this because the micro is seen as more ‘real’, more ‘authentic’? Does standardisation of methods lead to less interesting theorising? Are methods within STS already too standardised (in the form of case studies) or would middle ranging itself lead to standardisation? (Zeiss & Hope) Within STS we are very good at opening up the methods of others but perhaps less good at doing it for ourselves. Some of the papers in the workshop directly countered this tendency by exploring the links between ‘middle-range’ and method (Geels), thinking through practices such as: multi-sited ethnography (Hine); memory work (Berg); distinguishing for methodological purposes between action (to be analysed) and scenery (to be black-boxed) (Collins); ‘exnovating’ data (Mesman); and the analysis of temporality (Beaulieu, Scharnhorst & Wouters).
Why would we want a middle-range sensibility? A fourth theme that was discussed from the outset was the very desirability of anything in the middle. After all, why would we want, if not a middle-range theory, at least a middle-range sensibility? Would it facilitate legitimation within the academy, would it enable inter- and trans-disciplinarity? Would it allow STS concepts to travel? Or, as posed by some participants, would having a middle help STS to be at the centre of sociology (or other STS ‘parent’ disciplines) (Yearley), of adjunct disciplines (such as political science or policy studies), or of policy-making itself (Hagendijk; Farrands)? Alternatively, does an STS sensibility open up the ‘middle’ for other disciplines, such as urban studies (Coutard & Guy)? So, some participants wanted ideas that can travel and resonate between disciplines, between research and policy/politics, between STS colleagues working on different topics, or with students. If not middle-range theories, some wanted ‘tellable’ stories (Simakova). But this resonance and tellability is not a transcendental or essential quality, again it is about people themselves being connected in a moment of resonance. Returning to the idea of the middle range as a noun, middle range is frequently regarded as a possible bridge between micro the macro, but – as the workshop discussion soon established – the metaphor of a bridge presupposes you know what the fixed points are and its linearity can be restrictive. A different metaphor would be that of a lens, that allows simultaneous focusing or rapid refocusing on different perspectives. This gets closer to the notion of mobility, to enable movement between different audiences, and the middle itself becomes a metaphor for the need to engage, to travel. Equally it recognises scale itself as constructed and contested. But it also introduces another notion of middle range as noun, but now as a resource for our own research as well as contributing to the development of a resource for others. Finally, and perhaps not co-incidentally, a theme raised on the final day was that ‘ranging’ implied a longing for home. A longing, it was suggested, that maybe within STS we also have because of our fears of being uprooted from disciplinary anchors, and, for some of us, of feeling institutionally precarious. Possibly endemic within STS, such fears, one participant suggested, manifest as ‘reificaphobia’ (© Halffman) – the fear and also the challenge that anything within the discipline should settle or solidify for too long.
Summary of programme Further to the people indicated as authors below (names in brackets indicate absent co-author), Willem Halffman, Helen Kennedy, Sabina Leonelli, Paul Wouters and Sally Wyatt were present as discussants, each providing up to ten minutes of commentary on individual papers. In total, seventeen papers were discussed during the workshop. In addition, Steve Rayner gave an open lecture entitled, The Excluded Middle? Reflections on micro-, meso- and macro- in the social science of global change, attended by approximately 45 people.
Steve Yearley, Reflection & explanation in science studies: Finding where the middle range lies.
Ragna Zeiss (& Tom Hope), On standardising STS, un-standardising theories & deconstructing STS standards.
Brian Rappert, On the mid-range: An exercise in disposing (or minding the gaps).
Frank Geels, Theories of the middle range in STS: Achievements & steps to be taken.
Norma Morris & Brian Balmer, A woman walks into a laboratory and is asked to take part in an experiment. Now theorise that.
Jessica Mesman, Exnovating styles of ordering & their embedded normativity.
Olivier Coutard (& Simon Guy), STS & the city: Contingency & hope vs. universalised pessimism in studies of the contemporary urban condition.
Arie Rip, Haven’t we got all the theory we need?
Steve Woolgar, The ethics of scale – Oh please, not middle range theories again!
Anne Beaulieu, Andrea Scharnhorst & Paul Wouters, Not another case study? Ethnography, formalisation & the scope of science.
Elena Simakova, ‘Softly, softly’ tagging the world: The accomplishment of RFID as a tellable story.
Christine Hine, Multi-sited ethnography as middle range methodology for STS.
Rob Hagendijk, Theorising public engagement with science & technology.
Alice Farrands, Bioethics & policy for stem cell research: Do we need a mid-range theory?
Anne-Jorunn Berg, Hard categories & hard work: Racialisation & feminist memory work.
Nik Brown, Home on the mid-range: Some notes on theory in STS.
Harry Collins, The Green-ink letters: Methodological relativism & the choice about how much of the world to treat as relative & how much as real.
Financial support for the workshop was received from the following: Science in Society Programme of the ESRC www.sci-soc-net/SciSoc; Amsterdam School of Communications Research, ASCoR, UvA www.fmg.uva.nl/ascor; European Association for the Study of Science and Technology, EASST, www.easst.net; Department of Science and Technology Studies, UCL, www.ucl.ac.uk/sts
Report of the Expert-Symposium at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, January 2006
What is the proper role of science in relation to policymaking? How should scientific advice to policymakers be institutionalised in government in a way more accountable to academic science and public concerns alike? Science is the major institution for producing knowledge pertaining to political decision making and regulation. However, concerns about the quality of scientific expert advice to policy-makers have been raised for years in the UK and by the EU. Past experience with public debates such as the BSE case or the controversy about genetically engineered food show that the legitimacy of experts and of the policy makers whom they advise essentially depends on the reliability and transparency of scientific advice. This has highlighted the absence of clear rules to follow as well as a legal framework and structures for obtaining institutionalised advice from academics. Thus, the issue of quality control and assurance in scientific expert advising is of vital importance for both, decision makers and the academic community.
With these problems in mind, the interdisciplinary research group “Scientific Advice to Policy in Democracy” of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities has organised the expert symposium “Quality Control and Assurance in Scientific Policy Advice”, January 12-14, 2006 (with generous support by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation). The idea of this international high-level symposium was to have scientific consultants, agency heads and distinguished science studies scholars exchange their ideas and perspectives. Presentations were given amongst others by leading scientific advisers like Sir David King, chief scientific advisor to the UK Government, Geoffrey Podger, by that time Executive Director of the European Food Safety Authority, and Peter D. Blair, former Assistant Director of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) of the United States Congress, as well as by distinguished science studies scholars like Sheila Jasanoff, Naomi Oreskes and Peter Weingart.
For the first time, this symposium has assembled the perspectives and experiences of advisory bodies that have been functioning as “model organisations” for the institutional implementation of scientific advice across Europe and the United States. These advisory bodies can be regarded as model organisations because they have been functioning as blue prints or as reference points for the institutionalisation of scientific policy advice in their field. The symposium gave a review of the broad spectrum of the different procedures of quality control as well as the different institutional arrangements putting these procedures into practice within these organisations.
On a theoretical level, the role of scientific expertise in the policy process has been a core issue in the social study of science: Quality control, and particularly review by peers, is a central institution of the scientific system itself (cf. Merton 1973). As such it has been of major interest in science studies (cf. e.g. Chubin / Hackett 1990; Jasanoff 1987; Jasanoff 1985). However, regulatory or policy oriented science differs in important respects (such as goals, tasks institutions, time-frames and its accountability) from basic or curiosity driven science. Moreover, even within a scientific community, different experts may weigh evidence differently and adhere to different standards of demonstration – particularly in cases where their results have political or economic ramifications (cf. Oreskes 2004). Therefore, controlling and assuring the quality of scientific advice for public policy making is neither a uniform nor even a well-defined procedure, as more than a decade in science studies has shown (cf. most notably Jasanoff 1990).
In addition, recent developments in the relationship between science and politics are also affecting the system of quality control (cf. e.g. Maasen / Weingart 2005; Hemlin / Rasmussen 2006): ‘Fitness for function’ is increasingly becoming the norm in policy oriented science and scientific advice to policy (cf. e.g. Funtowicz 2001). But results that work may not be easy to accomplish, because the production and provision of science advice takes place in particular institutional arrangements and under particular constraints like uncertainty and emergent time frames. The need for knowledge quality assessment at the science-policy interface was emphasised in the presentation by Arthur Petersen and Silvio Funtowicz on quality management and extended peer review at the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. Moreover, as Willem Halffman pointed out in his discussion note, norms guiding professional conduct in scientific expert advising will have to take into account a broad variety of different tasks performed under the heading of expert advice such as reviewing, reflecting and mediating. This resonates with a reflexive turn and a process (rather than product) orientation in scientific advisory organisations (cf. Hemlin / Rasmussen 2006).
On the political level, evaluation and quality control in regulatory science and scientific policy advice is also in urgent demand of politics and in government settings, as became apparent in the presentation by Manfred Hennecke. In his paper, he discussed the German Federal Institute for Materials and Testing that was founded in 1870/71 as the former Prussian Royal Mechanical and Technical Research Institute. However, when it comes to such tasks as the evaluation of the production and provision of expert knowledge, the uncritical use of success criteria often yields unexpected and advert consequences in science (cf. for the use of scientometric indicators Weingart 2005). The basic dilemma for a scientific advisory body is how to effectively produce, assess and provide scientific expertise to public policy makers in a way accountable to both sides of the science-policy boundary. This dilemma has led to a shift in the organisational forms of policy advice towards so called “boundary organisations” (a nice review of the discussion in science studies and organisational studies is given in: Jacob 2005). One instructive kind of boundary organisations that was discussed at the symposium is the Dutch sector council model presented by Bert de Wit. The sector councils function as a kind of “knowledge broker” by giving meta-level advice from a cross-departmental perspective. As another important example of a boundary organisation, the agency model that gains increasing popularity on the European level was discussed on the examples of the European Food Safety Authority (Geoffrey Podger) and of the European Environment Agency (David Gee; cf. also Waterton / Wynne 2004). From the perspective of scientific advice to risk regulation, Podger emphasised the eminent importance of stakeholder consultation at expert level before a final opinion is reached.
But how can the impact of scientific expert advice be evaluated outside the scientific community? This fundamental question was most explicitly addressed in Susan Owens paper on the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution: Drawing on a discourse analysis, she was able to show that the commission has contributed significantly to the development and acceptance of modern concepts such as integrated pollution control. Following Owens, effectiveness of scientific policy advice can be best described in terms of policy learning (cf. also Owens 1999). Further evidence was given by Peter D. Blair’s comparison of the NRC-study process and the OTA-assessment process: The strength of an OTA style analysis lies in a broad policy context, paralleling that of congressional deliberation, where (a.) questions involve broader societal, economical and environmental issues, (b.) a consensus view is highly unlikely and where (c.) many legitimate courses of policy action are possible. However, the demise of the OTA in 1994 shows the limitation of the Mertonian norms in guiding the production of scientific expertise and policy advice (cf. for a further critique Hamlin 2005: 402ff).
But where do we go from here? The symposium revealed several impediments on the way to a responsible practice of scientific policy advice:
Firstly, the responsiveness of organised science to public concerns about contentious issues will have to be increased. In order to restore and enhance the credibility of its advice, organised science will have to engage with the public in an open and transparent discourse over these issues. This is not only a question of enlightening and improving the public understanding of science but one of taking science’s role as a dialogue partner seriously and making this process really become a two-way discussion process. In particular, as Heather Douglas has pointed out, one has to be careful about bias in expert judgement as well as to somehow capture the different societal, experiential and epistemic perspectives on the problem at issue (cf. also Brown / Lentsch / Weingart 2006, with regard to citizen participation Brown 2006, and with regard to the role of values in science Douglas 2004 and, still the locus classicus, Rudner 1953). The issue of quality control pertaining to the use as well as the provision of scientific expertise by NGOs was broached by Paul Johnston from Greenpeace Research Laboratories, Exeter. In particular, he pointed out that precaution has to be necessarily science-based, but inevitably requires that decisions be made in the face of unresolved uncertainties (cf. also Johnston / Santillo 1999). In general, as was argued by Sheila Jasanoff, the quality of scientific expertise and regulatory information will be improved by coupling procedures of scientific analysis and deliberation.
Secondly, the question was raised whether scientific policy advice is in need of professional standards of conduct. In his opening lecture, Sir David King, UK Chief Scientific Advisor, presented his “Rigour, Respect and Responsibility: A Universal Ethical Code for Scientists” as well as the British Chief Scientific Advisor’s Guidelines as instructive examples of how such codes for ethical as well as professional conduct might look like.
Thirdly, the symposium highlighted the importance of taking into account the difference between policy advice and political advice: Policy Advice is about using science to broaden the range of choices available to decision makers. In order to fulfil this task, horizon-scanning, mitigating the effects of departmentalisation of scientific expert advising as well as first identifying and articulating effectively the needs and the place for scientific advice in policy development will be important measures as Sir David King pointed out. Moreover, as the OTA legacy as presented in Blair’s paper shows, it is often essential that science takes a partisan stance towards politics on behalf of the public interest; for this purpose, mechanisms will have to be developed that integrate and accommodate scientific and policy debates (cf. also Hamlin 2005: 16). Whereas policy advice broadens the range of choices, political advice goes along with a reduction of choices – preferable to one single option. However, often both aspects are related to one another: Abstaining from settling on one ”best option“ in advising policy sometimes means to take the risk that political decision or regulation about scientifically or technologically complex issues will be made on the basis of a poor risk analysis (cf. Pielke Jr. 2003).
Finally, the symposium has highlighted the importance of what Sheila Jasanoff has called the “three body problem of expertise” (Jasanoff 2005), namely, that accountability measures of scientific policy advice have to take into account all three bodies relevant to the effective integration of science and politics: Firstly, the bodies of knowledge that the experts represent (“good science”), secondly, the bodies of the experts themselves (“unbiased experts”) and, thirdly, the bodies through which experts offer judgements in the policy domain (“balanced committees”) (ibid.: 211). In order to succeed in establishing an effective and responsible system of scientific policy advice, it is crucial how the different lines of responsibility and accountability to both, academic science and politics, are organised and institutionalised. This point was nicely illustrated by Frank den Butter’s paper on the Dutch “polder model” and the institutional set-up of (economic) policy preparation in the Netherlands. The polder model goes back to Jan Tinbergen, the first Nobel prize laureate in economics. It relies on a clear separation of lines of accountability in policy preparation: firstly, a consensus on the mechanisms of the economy as formalised in econometric models; secondly, a compromise on policy goals between the different parties and, thirdly, on an independent and uncontroversial collection of data by an autonomous agency, the Central Bureau of Statistics. The aim of the polder model is to ensure the scientific quality of the policy preparation on the one hand and to gain public acceptance of the policy measures on the other. Since the foundation of the Central Planning Bureau by Tinbergen in 1948 this model has been serving as a blue print for the institutional set up of policy advice in the Netherlands (cf. also den Butter / Mosch 2003 and den Butter / Morgan 2000). However, the indubitable success of the Dutch Polder Model is dependent upon the specifics of the Netherlands: a relatively small number of key actors, a corporatists culture and a high mobility between academia, planning bureaus, advisory councils and think tanks at ministries.
To sum up, it is not by coincidence that this expert symposium was convened by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities: Being one of the most outstanding bodies of organised science in Germany, responding to the societal need for reliable and credible expert advice is of highest priority to the Academy. The symposium has disclosed some of the most pertinent questions and difficulties attached to issues of quality in scientific policy advice. Moreover, it became apparent that a standardised and universal answer to the quality question in scientific policy advice is highly unlikely and, in many cases, will even not be appropriate and desirable. However, the symposium has convincingly demonstrated how science studies scholarship can very well contribute to a kind of benchmarking by which “best practices” within the institutional landscape of scientific policy advice can be identified.
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Report on a workshop at the Free University of Berlin, September 5-6 2005.
The concept of path dependency and the associated notion of path creation are attracting more and more researchers across different fields of study. To date, a fair amount of conceptual work has been done in areas such as economics, sociology and political science. Two major fields of research are studies on technological and organizational paths. During the development of this burgeoning area of research, the need for an answer to methodological problems has increased, as the idea of path processes is used in a growing number of empirical studies. In reaction to this need, Arie Rip (University of Twente), Jörg Sydow (Free University of Berlin) and Arnold Windeler (Technical University of Berlin) invited researchers to a small workshop to share their ideas on approaches to path-related research questions and to mutually confront the challenge of measuring path dependency. The participants were asked to present their empirical project and research questions, explain the theoretical backgrounds to and explicit understanding of paths and path dependency, and finally to offer potential solutions for the problem of concrete measurement. The workshop was divided into two sub-themes; technological path dependencies on the one hand, and organizational and institutional path dependencies on the other.
Arie Rip made his introductory statements on how to measure a path and placed emphasis on the conditions of path reversal (emerging irreversibility). Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler then took over, presenting their concept of path constitution analysis, a framework made up of six different modes of constituting technological paths. Soon it became obvious that the approaches to path measurement were significantly dependent on the researcher’s understanding of what a path actually is and what it consists of, which - in turn - was to a certain extent biased by the theoretical background. While some stressed the enabling features of a path, highlighting choice and agency, others focussed on “the dark side of paths” with more weight on dependency and determinism. Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler made a plea to go beyond the dichotomy of path dependency and path creation and to look, instead, for a more neutral understanding of path generation.
As a starting point for the debate, Guido Möllering (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies) confronted the audience with a fruitful list of some 30 indicators for the existence of a path used in seminal literature. He stated that abstract phenomena like paths could not be measured directly, but rather had to be gauged using certain indicators for each path-mechanism. Among the later discussed mechanisms or causes of path dependencies were increasing returns, self-reinforcement, lock-in and learning. In the following presentations, a wide range of possible indicators for these mechanisms were proposed.
The first day’s session on technological paths was chaired by Werner Rammert (Technical University of Berlin). Douglas K.R. Robinson’s (University of Twente) idea was to measure the escalation of activity as a sign of increasing irreversibility in a nanotechnological path, e.g. by counting certain keywords that were picked up during interviews. Uli Meyer (Technical University of Berlin) presented his analysis of institutional conditions and aspects of technological innovation in the automobile industry with respect to the development of “Advanced Driver Assistance Systems”. Another idea was to measure the building of momentum in the creation of a path. This was illustrated by using examples from multinational R&D-consortia in the semiconductor industry (Jörg Sydow, Arnold Windeler, Guido Möllering, Cornelius Schubert). Inspired by structuration theory, here it was proposed that the momentum of a technological path be measured by indicators of allocative and authoritative resources (e.g. sunk costs and sets of actor relations) as well as rules of signification and legitimation (e.g. technology roadmaps and norms).
Organizational and institutional paths were the topic of the second day’s session chaired by Arie Rip (University of Twente). Studying the development of the German newspaper market for high quality journalism, Jochen Koch (Free University of Berlin) proposed a phase model of organizational and strategic paths (with focus on institutional inertia) to explain the crisis in the German newspaper industry. Here, the supposed lock-in will be indicated by a certain strategic pattern that inhibits blindness to alternatives. Kim van Nieuwaal (Free University of Amsterdam) introduced the notion of an institutional survival path of firm-emphasised government/firm-interaction in shaping the strategic path of firms in the Dutch cockle industry. Marc Roedenbeck, Jan Strobel and Markus Tepe (all members of the doctoral program “Research on Organizational Paths”; Free University of Berlin) focused on economic indicators for a lock-in and introduced their idea of enforcement costs.
Throughout the debates, the importance of stringency in moving towards refined measuring methods became more and more evident, if arbitrariness was to be prevented. Arnold Windeler stated that if one did not have a theory first, the number of indicators would rise close to infinity. Others called for careful distinction between paths of different fields and levels, e.g. between those of organizations and interorganizational networks or technologies and institutions. Jochen Koch remarked positively that the path had not only been referred to in a metaphorical way throughout the workshop and argued for further elaboration of theory, which in turn would help to solve the measurement problem.
Overall, the discussions led to a number of theory-led candidates for indicators that went beyond dominant design and sunk-costs; ranging from sets of actor relations, path-related activities and the escalation of activity to emerging cognitive frames and degree of reflexivity. Above all, momentum was seen as an elementary aspect of paths. In the end, two major challenges remained: First, the process-relatedness of the path had to be taken into account even more, e.g. by identifying loops between system and environment, as Jochen Koch suggested. Second, the sometimes implicit linearity of the path concepts had to be restricted. The idea of paths branching off and/or intermingling with each other was seen as promising and in need of further elaboration.
Despite the concern of the group that measuring path dependency somewhat resembled “nailing jelly to the wall”, everyone felt that the issues discussed would help in future research, even though problems had not only been solved, but also brought up. The participants decided to re-convene in a year’s time, when everyone would attempt to supplement the concept of the path with actual data.
The EIASM Workshop “Organizing Path – Path of Organizing”, convened by Peter Karnøe (Copenhagen Business School), Guido Möllering (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne) and Jörg Sydow (Free University of Berlin) and to be held 3-4 November 2006 at the Free University in Berlin, may offer an opportunity for that. For more information visit: http://www.eiasm.org/frontoffice/eventannouncement.asp?eventid=449