Review of: Hans Radder, In and About the World: Philosophical Studies of Science and Technology, SUNY Press, 1996.
There was a time when philosophers of science neglected the role of the sociology of science by insisting on the good old distinction between analytical philosophical studies of scientific justification and the historically contingent settings for scientific discoveries. Even if this distinction has somehow faded, philosophers of science may still doubt the relevance of the sociology of science, especially constructivist versions, by finding associated relativist claims wildly implausible.
But none of these attitudes will do, says the Dutch philosopher Hans Radder. Given the amount of, for example, constructivist studies that has documented the social dimension of all levels of the scientific enterprise during the last twenty years or so, Radder’s view is hardly surprising. Still, it remains a good question exactly how constructivst insights can be adapted to a philosophical understanding of science. At least a good question for philosophers. But a social analyst who feels the need for some philosophical ground to stand on also could benefit from Radder’s discussion of the question. Even a philosophically disinterested science studies scholar should be moved by the question, since Radder lines up a number of normative reasons to take philosophy seriously. For instance, Radder points out that if we were to take constructivist relativism at face value, we would not be able to deal with science related environmental problems. As a concrete case, Radder notes that the hole in the ozone layer will not disappear just by ceasing to talk about it as some relativists seem to suggest. The relevance of the example is based, of course, on the assertion that the hole constitutes a problem in the first place, which some may be inclined to dispute. But few would deny that there are real problems related to the technoscientific society which need to be addressed by means other than just talking. Action is needed. And Radder’s aim is to show that such action can and ought to be philosophically guided.
In and About the World is largely adapted from Radder’s previous publications (but with new introductory and final chapters) and contains a very broad range of topics. Indeed, there is a long way from the role of heuristics in the genesis of quantum mechanics to the implementation of biotechnology in Barbados. Nevertheless, the clear overview of the contents early in the book points out how these diverse fields are related to Radder’s philosophical framework.
The argument in the first half of the book, dealing with epistemological and ontological aspects of science, can be summarized as follows. Radder sets off in experimental (physical) science by arguing that reproducibility is a significant feature of experimental practice. Reproducibility of experiments implies non-local patterns of experimental practice which cannot be understood solely as artifacts of specific social settings or local circumstances. Next, Radder examines how continuity and discontinuity go hand in hand within theoretical practices in (physical) science. Specifically, he analyses the correpondence principle from quantum mechanics and argues that transitions between successive theories may imply radical conceptual changes. Nevertheless, if successive theories simultaneously exhibit some formal mathematical correspondence it is reasonable to claim that the different conceptual frameworks refer to the same domain of reality - a reality which is bigger than we. Given the premise that theoretical terms, in order to refer, must also relate to reproducible experiments, Radder can state his ‘referential’ realism as a compromise between transcendental realism and constructivism: “If a (conceptual-theoretical) term from the theoretical description of a reproducible experiment refers, it ‘is about’ a persistent potentiality of reality, which as such is independent of the existence and knowledge of human beings” (p79). However, Radder continues, to realize these potentialities requires human work which essentially depends on contingent historical conditions.
Radder’s case for referential realism in physical science is well argued. It is not obvious, however, that referential realism is always the adequate response to epistemological and ontological questions in science. Radder’s key example of successive theories is classical mechanics vs. quantum mechanics. But the relation between these two theories is quite unique. In particular because classical mechanics, in addition to standing in a correspondence relation to quantum mechanics, is probably needed to make sense of quantum theory (see, for example, Favrholdt (1994)). Thus, the meaning of reference to ‘persistent potentialities of reality’ of quantum mechanical terms is crucially linked to terms in classical mechanics. This somehow mutes the conceptual discontinuity between these two theories and implies, in my view, that the realism issue within physics may be more differentiated than Radder suggests. Moreover, there are sciences where reproducible experiments and/or successive theoretical frameworks play a less distinctive role than in physics but where some reference to a human-independent reality may nevertheless come in handy. Take for instance marine biology where some science studies scholars have argued that scallops cannot be taken as the cause of scientists’ beliefs about them (see Collins and Yearley (1992)). Before attempting to defend referential realism in this case, it may be more relevant to ask the science studies scholars why the marine biologists are more real than the scallops.
Nevertheless, the referential realism that Radder argues proves relevant when linked to the latter half of the book which deals with reflexive and normative aspects of philosophy. First, Radder substantiates his criticism of the lack of ‘constructive’ normative aspects in constructivist studies by examining some inherent philosophical assumptions in social constructivism, ethnographical studies and actor network theory. Radder assures that studies aiming to document the social and/or local character of scientific or technological knowledge are important. But such studies by-pass actual problems of how to deal with issues like technology assessment or environmental controversies. Though Radder’s referential realism in itself does not point to any specific solutions either, the argument that scientific and technological knowledge also has to do with the material world seems to be a sensible starting point for normative reflextions on science and technology. It should be noted that Radder does not lump all versions of constructivism into one. For instance, Radder finds that actor-network theory, for Latour, has ‘nature’ solely as an artifact of network interactions but that Law’s version of the same theory grants more to the role of an autonomous nature (even though it may require network activity to reveal this role).
Radder’s criticism of the (missing) normative aspects in some constructivist studies of science and technology is convincing. But the practical advantage of Radder’s alternative might be met with some scepticism. Radder suggests that even though prediction and control in science and technology is essentially uncertain, we should “try to implement such scientific or technological projects that, according to the best of our knowledge, would cause minimal damage should they fail, and the material and social realization of which is democratically supported by all the people involved” (p114). Few would probably disagree with Radder, but what to do in a practical situation? Radder continues as follows: A technology is appropriate if it satisfies three criterions: 1) The products of the technological system and the possible courses of action resulting from it are desirable; 2) the material, psychological, social and cultural conditions required for the successful realization of the technological system are feasible and desirable; and 3) enough is known about the realization of the technological system to approach 1. and 2. in a sensible manner (p147). As Radder recognizes, this prescription is somewhat idealized and consequently it is better to speak about a ‘degree’ of appropriateness for a given technology. Clearly, the importance of assigning a degree of appropriateness to a given technological system comes from the possibility to compare it with ‘degrees’ of the alternatives to the technology in question (for instance, the degree of appropriateness of implementing the technological system).
The notion of appropriateness “makes explicit what is normatively at stake in modern technology and what should therefore be on the agenda in assessing the feasibility and desirability of technological systems in a just and democratic manner” (p151). In practice, however, the recommendations to the actors involved in the realization of technological systems “mostly amount to pinning down and criticizing less appropriate aspects of technologies and clarifying the conditions under which more appropriate realizations might be obtained” (p151). In addition to set up a theoretical framework for normative considerations of technology (including analyses of the intimate connections between technoscientific knowledge and power), Radder discusses a number of concrete cases such as aspects of nuclear energy technology in the Netherlands and the implementation of agricultural biotechnology in the Caribbean. Judging from these cases, relevant normative issues have indeed not always been taken into account in technology assessment and implementation.
But exactly how relevant normative issues should enter into a degree of appropriateness is not discussed in detail. For instance, how much does the desire of a third-world farmer to implement biotechnology count as appropriateness relative to a non-govermental organisation’s concern for the environment? Or how much does the opinion of other farmers, who are not asked to participate in the project, count? To be sure, I do agree that it would be wonderful if one could set up ways of measuring degrees of appropriateness. But in practical matters this may turn out to be a difficult task.
One thing that Radder stresses as particularly important is a substantive dialogue between prospective users of a technological system and the other actors involved in the realization of that system. It is, as Radder points out, necessary to hear the prospective users’ opinions about the desirability and feasibility of proposed projects. I have to admit that my knowledge of technology implementation is very limited. But hopefully this ‘minimum’ criterion in technology assessment does not come as any surprise for people dealing with such assessments. In any case, Radder makes an important point in arguing that a central normative question in technology discussions is appropriateness evaluations - even though it may be hard to get a firm grip on a quantitative ‘degree’.
Throughout the book, Radder states his points clearly and with detailed information on how his approach and ideas are situated with respect to other voices on the topics he addresses. It will, I think, be difficult to find scholars within science and technology studies or philosophers of science and technology who could not take something home from Radder’s book. Radder successfully points to ways in which philosophy is also important away from the armchair of analytical philosophy. In this sense Radder achieves his goal of showing how philosophy can be both theoretical, reflexive, and normative. Thus, Radder advocates a philosophy that has a role to play not only in thinking about science and technology but also when it comes to concrete action. Or, as Radder puts it, a philosophy that is at once in and about the world.
References
Favrholdt, D., 1994, “Niels Bohr and Realism” in J. Faye and H.J. Folse (eds.), Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. 153, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Collins, H. and Yearley S., 1992, “Epistemological Chicken” in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
author’s address: zink@nbi.dk